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Antitrust Law in the New Economy by 
Mark R Patterson1
THOMAS DICSI2
THE DRAFTERS OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT3 of 1890 would 
understandably be perplexed by the complexity of modern economic systems. 
These drafters, including the Act’s namesake, US Senator John Sherman, were 
operating in a world where protectionist economics dominated. Karl Marx had 
just recently completed his critique of untethered capitalism, Das Kapital, and 
international trade was largely confined to the exchange of raw materials. These 
drafters were responding to an issue very topical to the late-nineteenth century—
John D. Rockefeller’s monopoly over American oil. The situation came to a head 
in 1882 when Samuel Dodd, the attorney to Rockefeller’s company, Standard 
Oil, ingeniously used the doctrine of trusts to consolidate all of Rockefeller’s oil 
holdings—representing 90 per cent of the market—under a single controlling 
trust. It took the government 21 years to successfully use the Act to dismantle 
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Trust.4 
Times have changed. As in the late-nineteenth century, current economic 
relations are at risk of anti-competitive influences. In addition to the traditional 
1. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2017). 
2. Juris Doctor (2019), Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Canada.
3. 15 USC §§ 1-38 (1890).
4. Standard Oil Co of New Jersey v United States, 222 US 1 (1911).
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monopolistic risks,5 however, a new type of economic relationship has emerged 
that warrants discussion. In the traditional Rockefeller-type monopoly, the 
economic relationship influenced by monopolistic practices was between the 
supplier and consumer. The Rockefeller monopoly as the supplier, with effective 
control over the oil industry, could price gouge and drive-out competition, raising 
the costs of oil for the end consumer. The new type of economic relationship is 
instead focused on third-party information providers that serve as “middle-men” 
between the supplier and the consumer. These middle-men—including Google, 
Yelp, Amazon, and eBay—are instead pure information providers, who, with 
sufficient market share of their respective fields (search results, reviews, online 
sales, et cetera), can engage in monopolistic practices. One such practice could be 
to have suppliers bid for preferential treatment, which could include increasing 
the frequency a product appears in a search query. If done by Google or Amazon, 
this could have a significant effect on consumer preference.
Take for example Google’s altruistic decision in April 2017 to change their 
search algorithm. These changes, according to Google, were done to address 
the issue of individuals and companies manipulating their website content so 
Google’s algorithm would provide them with more favourable treatment during 
search queries.6 Google’s changes were also partly in response to the 2016 
presidential election and what Google referred to as the “phenomenon of ‘fake 
news.’7 The changes favoured more established news networks over independent, 
“fringe” outlets. Within months, these alternative fringe news outlets experienced 
significant drops in readership.8 One outlet, the “World Socialist Web Site,” 
5. See generally David Leonhardt, “The Monopolization of America”, The New York Times (25 
November 2018), online: <www.nytimes.com> [perma.cc/H26F-JK57]; Barry C Lynn, 
“America’s Monopolies Are Holding Back the Economy”, The Atlantic (22 February 2017), 
online: <www.theatlantic.com> [perma.cc/8NHL-RF4X].




8. Daisuke Wakabayashi, “As Google Fights Fake News, Voices on the Margins Raise 
Alarm,” The New York Times (26 September 2017), online: <www.nytimes.com> 
[perma.cc/UX9A-YVZK].
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wrote in an open letter to Google that various left-wing news outlets had seen a 
significant drop in readership.9 
As with anything in law, a simple deviation in fact or focus of analysis can 
completely upend the applicability of a legal doctrine. Mark Patterson’s book, 
Antitrust Law in the New Economy, explores the applicability of American 
antitrust law regarding these new economic relationships. Patterson argues for 
the reconceptualization of information as a formal product—and thus under 
the purview of antitrust law—acknowledging that information has the same 
potential for monopoly and collusion as traditional products. 
Patterson starts the discussion by providing a comprehensive and, at times, 
rather theoretical explanation regarding the intersections of antitrust law, 
consumer protection law, and the new economics of information. He uses the 
first three chapters to define the “new economy” of information and explore 
whether this new economy should be regulated under consumer protection law or 
antitrust law. Unsurprisingly, he suggests that antitrust law is in the best position 
to tackle the antitrust problems of the new economy. According to Patterson, 
consumer protection is unable to tackle these problems due to its focus on fraud 
within individual transactions (as opposed to the more macro considerations of 
antitrust law). Consumer protection is an individualized body of law; the issue is 
still one of deception of individuals by particular statements.10 Antitrust law on 
the otherhand focuses on the effects of a firm’s monopolistic practices rather than 
on more macro-considerations, such as the overall price of a product.
In part II, Patterson presents four scenarios where information providers could 
utilize their control over their product to hurt competition. As with traditional 
antitrust situations, information providers could enter into agreements with 
other firms to limit information. Although such practices are not uncommon 
in traditional antitrust cases, Patterson suggests that the new economy has 
exacerbated the situation, pointing to the severity of the LIBOR-benchmark-
rate scandal of 2008.11 Patterson points to companies with substantial market 
power unilaterally excluding information, such as Google. Undeniably, Google 
9. The letter noted, for example, that “www.mediamatters.org” saw a 42 percent drop in Google 
search results and “democracynow.org” similarly saw 36 percent drop. World Socialist 
Website, “An open letter to Google: Stop the censorship of the internet! Stop the political 
blacklisting of the World Socialist Web Site!,” (August 2017), online: <www.wsws.org/en/
articles/2017/08/25/pers-a25.html> [perma.cc/WA4W-64XD].  
10. Patterson, supra note 1 at 25-27.
11. Ibid at 87-115. See generally James McBride, “Understanding the Libor Scandal” (12 
October 2016), online: Council on Foreign Relations <www.cfr.org/backgrounder/
understanding-libor-scandal> [perma.cc/S9ZB-DPRV]. 
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has substantial market power as is evident in the consequences of their changes 
in search algorithm and in the phenomenon of “lead generators” discussed in 
the book.12 The problem is determining whether Google’s search algorithm is 
anti-competitive. For example, should the antitrust focus be on exclusionary 
practices in general, or exclusionary practices that have anti-competitive 
consequences? They are both equally troublesome, but, as Patterson suggests, 
“if the effect of a change is as significant for non-competitors as for competitors, 
a court might be unwilling to treat a change [in algorithm] as exclusionary.”13 
Patterson shifts focus for his last two scenarios to issues relating to the 
quantity of product information available in the market. The first scenario, coined 
as “confusopoly” from Scott Adam’s Dilbert comic-strip, evaluates instances 
where firms overload information onto consumers to essentially confuse them. 
Patterson provides the example of the cell-phone market with its abundance of 
phone plans: Various plans are offered with different combinations of minutes, 
data, and other services, which result in roughly the same cost, but confuse the 
customers into believing there are significant cost-savings. The scenario creates 
the impression that the customer is making an informed decision, when in 
reality there is a substantial information asymmetry.14 Interestingly, Patterson 
shifts the focus here from large information conglomerates like Google and 
Amazon and focuses on retailers like Kodak and Toys R’ Us. He even explores 
whether information providers like Yelp, Amazon, and Standard & Poor could 
alleviate the information asymmetry that retailers like Kodak have in relation 
to their customers by providing alternative, clear products on one central, 
virtual marketplace.
Finally, Patterson offers what is arguably the most topical of his scenarios: 
Situations where companies utilize personal information to tailor their 
responses.15 The obvious example would be Google and Facebook’s use of 
personal information to individually tailor advertisements for their respective 
12. Patterson, supra note 1 at 138-142, citing David Segal, “Fake Online Locksmiths May Be 
Out to Pick Your Pocket, Too,” The New York Times (30 January 2016), online: <www.
nytimes.com> [perma.cc/F4GE-9YN7].
13. Ibid at 142.
14. Ibid at 146-47.
15. For recent trends of Google and Facebook’s use of personal information, see Jennifer 
Valentino-DeVries et al, “Your Apps Know Where You Where Last Night and They’re Not 
Keeping It Secret,” The New York Times (30 January 2016), online: <www.nytimes.com> 
[perma.cc/F4GE-9YN7]; Brian X Chen, “Google’s File on Me Was Huge. Here’s Why It 
Wasn’t As Creepy as My Facebook Data,” The New York Times (16 May 2018), online: <www.
nytimes.com> [perma.cc/P4VS-3ERF]. 
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users. Patterson’s analysis of the commodification of personal information in this 
chapter is illuminating, but there is a glaring, very topical issue not discussed: 
Facebook’s role as a primary news source and the consequences this had on the 
2016 US presidential election.16 This is not Patterson’s fault, as the realities of 
Facebook’s role only became apparent in late 2017. Further, Patterson seems to 
want the book’s focus to be of “commercially significant information,”17 and not 
on the role of information providers in political matters. However, this raises the 
issue of what role antitrust plays for information providers when their power 
as information providers is (allegedly) manipulated by third-parties. Patterson 
seems to be hinting at a sequel tackling this issue, evident from the final section 
of the book, “Beyond Commerce?”18
Part III discusses two complications when trying to apply antitrust principles 
to information providers: intellectual property law and First Amendment rights. 
The former is easily understandable, as intellectual property rights empower the 
rights-holder to limit the use of the protected information. The latter can be 
used to protect information providers, as their information could be considered 
“speech” and thus protected under the First Amendment. Again, this section 
begged for a discussion about the 2016 US presidential election and Facebook’s 
role in the dissemination of political information. Particularly, whether Facebook 
could claim their platform as a medium for free speech, which seems to be its 
automatic response. For example, in the 10 April 2017 US Senate hearing with 
Mark Zuckerberg, Senator John Thune questioned the Facebook CEO about 
the alleged supressing of conservative news: “[C]ould you assure us that when 
you are improving tools to stop bad actors, that you will err on the side of 
protecting speech especially political speech from all different corners?”19 Mark 
Zuckerberg responded:
16. Mike Isaac & Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Russian Influence Reached 126 Million Through 
Facebook Alone,” The New York Times (30 October 2017), online: <www.nytimes.com> 
[perma.cc/WC6P-FPPZ]. There are arguments that it is impossible to measure how 
much, if any, influence Russia had through their social media interference campaign. 
It is undeniable, however, that a substantial portion of Americans sometimes get the news 
from social media platforms like Facebook. See Elisa Shearer & Katerina Eva Matsa, 
News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2018 (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 
September 2018).
17. Patterson, supra note 1 at 236.
18. Ibid.
19. US, Hearing Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the United 
States Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: Testimony of Mark Zuckerberg, 
115th Cong (2018).
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Senator, yes. That’s our—that’s our approach. If there is an eminent threat of harm, 
we’re going to take [a] conservative position on that and make sure that we flag 
that and understand that more broadly. But overall, I want to make sure that we 
provide people with the most voice possible. I want the widest possible expression 
and I don’t want anyone at our company to make any decisions based on the—the 
political ideology of the content.20
Although the question was not necessarily about the role of Facebook in the 
2016 election, Zuckerberg’s evoking of First Amendment principles seems to be 
part of a larger trend by information providers to divert attention away from their 
substantial market power.
Overall, the book could have benefited from incorporating the political 
consequences of informational power. Although Patterson makes it clear that 
his focus is on the commercial consequences of powerful information providers 
rather than political, this suggests that the two are separable. While antitrust law 
is not generally concerned with non-commercial considerations, it is undeniable 
that considerable market share could have political effects that inherently cause 
consumers “commercial harm.” Despite this minor criticism, Patterson’s book 
provides an impressive discussion of an undeniably complex topic. Patterson 
accomplishes far more than what he set out to do. He begins the book with 
the simple phrase, “knowledge is power.”21 He then proceeds to hook the reader 
for 237 pages, elaborating on this phrase. His analysis is rigorous and detailed, 
yet laid out with impressive simplicity. He connects the seemingly high-level 
discussion of antitrust law to everyday life: from toys to hotels, to photocopiers, 
and to gym contracts.22 Patterson’s work is a must-read for anyone remotely 
interested in the new economy or antitrust law. 
20. Ibid [emphasis added].
21. Patterson, supra note 1 at 1.
22. Ibid at 131, 149, 152-5.
